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RES JUDICATA AND MULTI-STATE
INTEGRATION
Lea Brilmayer*
CIVIL JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND THE INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE-STATE ASSOCIATIONS: CENTRAL AMERICA, THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

By Robert' C Casad. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas.
1981. Pp. xiii, 258. $25.
When Central America comes up in conversation these days, it
isn't usually with regard to the law of res judicata. For this reason,
Robert Casad's recent book on civil judgment recognition is likely to
provoke some strange reactions. True, the book's title suggests that
its subject is European and American law in equal proportions with
Central American. But sources on European and American law are
relatively easy to find: the book's distinctive contribution, to which
most of its pages are dedicated, is its description and analysis of the
law of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
and Panama. During this time of political unrest and human rights
controversy, a book on local judgments law has a macabre tinge. Res
judicata is a quintessentially technical subject, while the profound
political controversies the area has generated transcenq mere legalisms, to say the least. Yet if Casad's hypotheses are sound, this apparently technical book is more timely than at first it might appear.
The book treats civil judgment recognition as one manifestation
of the extent of integration of member states into a federated union.
Civil judgment recognition is taken as a sign of healthy intra-federation relations. The first chapter, accordingly, is a summary historical
account of the recurrent efforts of the Central American nations to
organize politically into a common union. Special attention is given
to the frequent reciprocal promises, in treaty provisions, to honor the
judgments of other Central American nations, and to attempts to
found a super-national judicial apparatus to implement these treaties. These attempts all failed eventually, although the interim success of some was considerable. Casad does not clearly spell out the
reasons for the failures. In at least one case, the disintegration was
attributable to United States interventionist policies (pp. 8-9). Although it is hard to know for certain, the other failures may have
• Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1976, University of California,
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been caused by the social and cultural differences among the nations,
which the author develops at the outset in order to refute appearances of homogeneity (pp. 1-2). It would have been interesting had
Casad pursued this inquiry further - but then, he did not intend to
write a history book.
Most of the remainder of the book concerns the Bustamante
Code, a treaty governing interstate judgment recognition in Central
America, and the meaning the Code has been given in the various
Central American nations. If the book contained no more than this
material, it would nevertheless be a significant contribution to the
literature. Solely as an introduction to one system's judgment law, it
would constitute a useful reference book. Americans, of course,
have few opportunities to acquaint themselves with this material.
Language differences are not the primary problem, although, of
course, it doesn't help that the primary and secondary literature is in
Spanish. More significant is the fact that the concepts, while sometimes bearing familiar names, are actually quite different. One example Casad discusses is "cosa juzgada," which sounds like "res
judicata" but bears an entirely different, civil law, meaning (p. 45).
Various jurisdictional doctrines pose the same problem. 1 To be honest, I found myself as mystified after the author's explanations of the
concepts as before. But then, the author himself acknowledges the
difficulties and ambiguities - and would any nutshell explanation
of American collateral estoppel be completely clear to citizens of
civil law countries? If nothing else, one gains an appreciation of the
fact that differences exist, and that one ought not to take apparent
similarities for more than they are worth.
One reason, then, to read the book might be to learn some law
from a part of the world that has not thus far been of sufficient commercial interest to spawn a large legal literature. It is not entirely
clear, however, what will be the practical utility of a working knowledge of Salvadoran judgment law. At any rate, the book aims
higher. Its title, after all, is general: "Civil Judgment Recognition
and the Integration of Multiple-State Associations." Its subtitle is
scarcely less general, denominating Central America, the European
Community, and the United States. Thus the second chapter, preceding the material on the laws of the various Central American nations, sets out theoretical and policy considerations underlying the
law of judgments. And the tenth chapter, following the descriptive
material, sets out to gauge the effectiveness of the Central American
apparatus by comparing its operation to that of the United States
and the European Common Market. The fact that there are only
cursory descriptions of those two systems, in contrast to the wealth of
detail on the individual Central American nations, is not a problem.
1. See, for example, his discussion of competency. P. 45.
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The typical reader brings to such a book so much more knowledge of
American and European systems than Central American arrangements that detailed description of the former might be a waste of
time. Yet, setting aside the contrasting numbers of pages spent, one
still comes away with the sense that this is, really, just a book on
Central American judgments law. The reason, I think, is that the
overarching theoretical analysis is so thin.
Casad describes how in each system a judgment for money damages rendered in a sister-nation would be enforced. He mentions, for
instance, the fact that in the United States a judgment enforcement
action is a contentious adversary proceeding (pp. 138-39), while in
Europe the defendant is not in the first instance entitled to notice
and an opportunity to defend. This tends to make judgment enforcement less automatic, less certain, and more costly in the United
States than in the European Community. Proceedings in Central
American countries are more contentious still, since Article 426 of
the Bustamonte Code gives the state itself a right to intervene (p.
140). Such comparisons are highly interesting: they challenge forcefully our unexamined notions about how things "have" to be. Yet
for two reasons, these thoughts just whet the reader's appetite.
First, we would want to know the true relationship between
friendly foreign relations and cooperative enforcement of judgments.
This is a question about how legal doctrine and the cultural, social,
and political order influence each other. It seems somewhat plausible that effective judgments enforcement might be symptomatic of
harmonious international relations, and harmonious relations a sign
of social homogeneity or at least cultural understanding. Conversely, countries at odds might decline to recognize one another's
sovereign acts. But is this true? And if it is true, then how true? For
instance, how much must relations deteriorate (or cultures diverge)
before an impact is felt on mutual judgment enforcement? The hypothesized connection in fact might be quite tenuous.
For instance, even if two nations were at war they might routinely enforce one another's judgments. The reason would be that
disregard for judgments is not a particularly effective pressure tactic.
If anything, it is symbolic. And the impact is mainly felt by litigants,
who may not have anything to do with the cause of the international
friction and who may even, in fact, be from the country in which
enforcement is sought. Casad recognizes this last point: he argues
that reciprocity is not a wise requirement in enforcement law for just
this reason (p. 20). Yet doesn't this suggest that enforcement is a
purely private matter, advancing or hindering the interests of litigants with no discernible effect on public interests? Why, indeed,
does the rendering state "care" about its judgments - its resources
are not being wasted by a second litigation. Its resources are a sunk
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cost, and if the enforcing state compels relitigation its waste of time
is its own problem. To put it bluntly, does judgments law matter,
even in the context of international relations?
Second, the comparisons that Casad makes are not the only ones
possible. In fact, they may be the wrong ones. He focuses primarily
on the ease of enforcement of a sister-state judgment in the various
systems. But ease of enforcement of a sister-state judgment may
only reflect the enforcing state's attitude toward that kind of judgment as a matter oflocal res judicata law. An example will illustrate
this problem. Many states of the United States treat child custody
awards as readily modifiable; they are difficult, in other words, to
enforce as rendered because states recognize a variety of defenses
such as changed circumstances.2 Assume that all of the member
states in System I enforce child custody awards automatically while
all of the states in System II enforce them only after reconsideration.
Then if we compare the intra-systemic enforcement of such cases in
System I to intra-systemic enforcement in System II, we might erroneously conclude that System I is more cooperative, more tightly integrated, than System IL Yet the "cooperativeness" thus identified
in System I is only an artifact of the more restrictive local foreclosure
rules in System I. The fact that interstate recognition of judgments
in the United States is a cumbersome adversary process shows nothing about relations among the states if intra-state recognition is an
equally cumbersome adversary process. Comparisons between the
former and non-adversary European proceedings may be
misleading.
I am not suggesting that Casad is unaware of this sort of refinement: there is no evidence that he has confused these issues, except
for the fact that he does not himself attempt to disentangle them.
The major disappointment of this book is not its failure of cultural
or political analysis, to which it does not seem to seriously aspire.
Its greatest fault is the incompleteness of the theoretical analysis of
doctrine, at which the book makes an ambitious start and for which
it provides a wealth of raw material. In the effort to show the analytic potential of Casad's creative choice of topic, I would venture a
few more thoughts about how intra-systemic cooperation in the context of judgments enforcement might be analyzed.
In evaluating intra-systemic coordination, we must take into account purely local effects. Treatment of sister-state judgments may
reflect only an attitude toward judgments generally, when what we
are really interested in is the treatment of sister-state judgments as
such. In other words, we are interested in a comparison between
comparisons. Within each system, we can compare the way each
2. See generally R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS ch. 6 (3d ed.
1981).
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state treats its sister-state's judgments. To measure the degree of integration of a system, we need to compare this degree of cooperation
(itself a comparison) to the degrees found in other systems, such as
the amount of respect accorded to domestic judgments:
Deference to Prior Court
in sister state (interstate recognition)

Degree of Integration

= --------Deference to Prior Court
in same state (local res
judicata rules). 3

Actually, there are at least two further refinements. The first is
that increased interstate recognition may be a product of adoption
of the rendering state's res judicata rules. The above model suggests
that the most fully integrated system is the one in which a state treats
a foreign judgment as it would treat its own: a nondiscrimination
model. In fact, however, a cooperative state might attempt to give a
sister-state's judgment exactly the same effect as the rendering state
would have, adhering to the rendering state's res judicata rules along
with its judgment. Thus interstate recognition (the extent of the
present court's deference to the prior decision in a sister-state) might
be compared to a hypothetical present court of that sister-state addressing enforcement of the judgment in question. The measure of
integration would then be:
Deference to Prior Court
in sister state (interstate recognition)

Degree of Integration

= ----------Deference to present
sister-state determination
(sister-state res judicata rules).

Neither measure of integration is obviously the better, or the more
"cooperative." The first focuses on the presence or absence of discrimination. The second measures the extent to which rights vest. 4
If two systems aspire to different ideals of cooperation, then comparing them involves comparing apples and oranges. Each may be marvelously cooperative in its own sort of way.
As a second refinement, if we truly wish to measure the degree of
integration within a system, we might compare rules regarding completely foreign judgments. For example, Alabama may be perfectly
happy to enforce New York's judgments. But in determining
3. The division sign is used here metaphorically, to indicate comparison of relative
strengths. It does not signify that actual number values might be assigned.
4. See Brilmayer, State Fo,feiture Rules and Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 741 (1982).
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whether this evidences intra-systemic cooperation within the United
States, we might be interested to know whether this fact is attributable to New York's status as a member of our federal union. How, in
comparison, does Alabama treat French judgments? We might
therefore construct another measure of cooperation:
Deference to Prior Court
in sister-state (interstate recognition)

Degree of Integration = - - - - - - - - Deference to Prior Court
in non-federated state.

This would express the purely intra-systemic aspects of the degree of
integration.
Obviously, there is a great deal that might be said about cooperation within groups of nations. By drawing attention to the similarities and differences among three sets of cooperating sovereign
entities, Casad's book raises powerful issues that any conflict of laws
or international law scholar should want to address. By failing to
provide theoretical structure, however, it falls short of success at its
ambitious project.

